Skip to main content

ITAR and EAR Control Guide

The conditions under which the ITAR and the EAR treat encrypted data as not exported, the rules on access by foreign persons, and who carries each one in a tiCrypt deployment. CMMC Level 2 guide NIST SP 800-171 Rev 3 guide

Quoted from 22 CFR 120.50 to 120.63 and from 15 CFR 734.13 to 734.19 and 772.1 in the eCFR, current as of November 10, 2026. Section 120.54 has been amended several times since 2024, most recently in 2026, so read the current text before you rely on a row.

tiCrypt enforces the cryptographic access boundary. The organization makes the export-control determination, decides who may join a project and whether its accounts are escrowed. This guide is not legal advice and does not say that a deployment qualifies for either encryption provision.

tiCrypt4Shared21University525 of 30 conditions and definitions addressed by tiCrypt alone or shared

One row per condition of the ITAR and EAR encryption provisions, with the definitions and release rules they rely on. An answer inherited from a CMMC Level 2 practice names the practice and keeps its wording, which speaks of CUI. Select a row to read it in full.

CitationTitleResponsibilityRequirementHow tiCrypt addresses itUniversity actionTopicCMMC L2 practicesSSP control card (800-53)Learn more
Deemed export
Shared
Releasing or otherwise transferring technical data to a foreign person in the United States (a deemed export);
A user has a decryption path to a project's data only if a resource's key has been re-encrypted to that user's public key. tiCrypt administrators, superadmins and operating-system root are cryptographically excluded from project data, and a running Secure VM has no interactive login path outside that access. Admitting only authorized U.S. persons to a project therefore leaves no non-U.S. person with a decryption path through normal use, VM access or administrative privilege.
Make the export-control determination and decide who may join the project. Key escrow is the one path that can exist outside project membership: see the row on the means of decryption.
Release and access information
Transfer between U.S. persons in the United States
Shared
Transmitting or otherwise transferring technical data to a U.S. person in the United States from a person in the United States;
AC.L2-3.1.1Every user authenticates with a unique RSA-2048 key pair plus password (signed challenge-response); there is no backdoor or shared access path. A user can open a resource only if its AES key has been re-encrypted to that user's public key.
AC.L2-3.1.1Run the account lifecycle: approve new accounts, assign teams and permission profiles, and remove users who no longer need access.
Not an export
Unclassified
University
Unclassified;
University control, not addressed by tiCrypt
Confirm that the data is unclassified. The export-control determination is the organization's.
Encryption provision
No CMMC Level 2 counterpart
Secured using end-to-end encryption
tiCrypt
Secured using end-to-end encryption;
SC.L2-3.13.8Data in transit is double-encrypted (TLS 1.2+ plus Diffie-Hellman session keys) with FIPS-validated algorithms, and SHA-256 verifies integrity.SC.L2-3.13.16CUI is AES-256 encrypted at rest: Vault files in 8 MB chunks with per-file keys, and VM drives with LUKS or BitLocker. Metadata such as file names is not encrypted at rest.AC.L2-3.1.13Remote sessions are double-encrypted: TLS plus a per-session Diffie-Hellman layer between client and VM, using FIPS-validated AES-256, RSA-2048, and SHA-256.
SC.L2-3.13.16Keep the storage that holds the ciphertext, and the unencrypted metadata database, inside your assessment scope: encrypted CUI is still CUI (CMMC FAQ, July 2026, question B-Q8). Do not put CUI in file or directory names.
Encryption provision
FIPS 140 cryptographic modules
tiCrypt
Secured using cryptographic modules (hardware or software) compliant with the Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 (FIPS 140-2) or its successors, supplemented by software implementation, cryptographic key management and other procedures and controls that are in accordance with guidance provided in current U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) publications, or by other cryptographic means that provide security strength that is at least comparable to the minimum 128 bits of security strength achieved by the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-128); and
SC.L2-3.13.11Every cryptographic operation that protects CUI runs through the OpenSSL 3.1.2 FIPS provider (CMVP #4985, FIPS 140-3) in approved mode: the key operations on the user's client and everything the VM controller does. tiCrypt implements no cryptography of its own. The backend encrypts no CUI; it verifies signatures and computes hashes with the Java runtime's libraries. Drive encryption inside VMs is performed by LUKS or BitLocker on the operating system's own validated modules, with the operating system's FIPS mode enabled.SC.L2-3.13.10Keys are generated client-side: a random 256-bit key per file and drive, wrapped with the user's RSA-2048 public key, and an RSA-2048 key pair per user. No key is stored unwrapped on the server. Key recovery uses escrow split across independent escrow groups, three by default.
SC.L2-3.13.10Define escrow groups (three by default) and their membership.
Encryption provision
Not sent to or stored in a proscribed country
Shared
Not intentionally sent to a person in or stored in a country proscribed in § 126.1 of this subchapter; and Note 1 to paragraph (a)(5)(iv): Data in-transit via the internet is not deemed to be stored in a country it transits.
AC.L2-3.1.3Within tiCrypt, CUI moves only through encrypted, audited channels (Vault transfers in encrypted chunks, managed tunnels). SFTP into the enclave is upload-only, and exports out of a project require explicit, logged authorization.
AC.L2-3.1.3Designate who may approve exports out of a project. Authorize where storage replication and backup jobs may copy tiCrypt's ciphertext, which is still CUI (CMMC FAQ, July 2026, question B-Q8).Choose where the hosts, storage, replicas and backups are located, and keep them out of the countries proscribed in 22 CFR 126.1.
Encryption provision
Not sent from a proscribed country
Shared
Not sent from a country proscribed in § 126.1 of this subchapter;
AU.L2-3.3.2Every action is tied to an authenticated user, session, and source IP, with millisecond UTC timestamps and a hash-chain position.SI.L2-3.14.6All VM traffic passes through the logged backend proxy; unauthorized attempts are blocked and recorded. The audit system provides alerting (e.g., impossible-travel logins, lockouts) and forensic queries.
SI.L2-3.14.6Run the monitoring program and route tiCrypt Audit alerts to your SOC or SIEM. Deploy your own monitoring tools on the host servers and inside VM images for the host, network and operating-system events tiCrypt does not see.Set and enforce the rule on project members connecting from a proscribed country, for example at the external firewall you operate.
Encryption provision
End-to-end encryption: no unencrypted form in between
Shared
The provision of cryptographic protection of data, such that the data is not in an unencrypted form, between an originator (or the originator's in-country security boundary) and an intended recipient (or the recipient's in-country security boundary); and
SC.L2-3.13.8Data in transit is double-encrypted (TLS 1.2+ plus Diffie-Hellman session keys) with FIPS-validated algorithms, and SHA-256 verifies integrity.SC.L2-3.13.16CUI is AES-256 encrypted at rest: Vault files in 8 MB chunks with per-file keys, and VM drives with LUKS or BitLocker. Metadata such as file names is not encrypted at rest.MP.L2-3.8.6Data is ciphertext from the moment it is created (AES-256), so media, replicas, and backups are protected in transport without the owner's key; network transport adds TLS plus Diffie-Hellman.
SC.L2-3.13.16Keep the storage that holds the ciphertext, and the unencrypted metadata database, inside your assessment scope: encrypted CUI is still CUI (CMMC FAQ, July 2026, question B-Q8). Do not put CUI in file or directory names.MP.L2-3.8.6Keep encrypted media, replicas, and backups under your media-handling procedures in transport, and send them only to systems inside your assessment scope. Encrypted CUI is still CUI (CMMC FAQ, July 2026, question B-Q8).Keep controlled data out of file and directory names, which the platform database holds unencrypted. Files sent to an SFTP inbox are encrypted on arrival, so keep the SFTP host inside your in-country security boundary.
Definition
End-to-end encryption: means of decryption
Shared
The means of decryption are not provided to any third party.
Keys are generated on the user's client and none is stored unwrapped on the server, so the infrastructure and its administrators hold no means of decryption. Tera Insights supplies tiCrypt as software and has no access to a deployment. Key escrow is the one path that can exist outside project membership: when it is enabled, a user's private key can be reconstructed only by one member of every escrow group acting together, three groups by default, and system administrators cannot serve on the escrow team.
Choose whether the project's accounts are escrowed. If they are, make sure every escrow member who could recover a key used on the project is authorized to receive the data, and govern and log key recovery as a controlled action. With escrow off there is no recovery path, and a lost key or forgotten password leaves the data unrecoverable.
Definition
Intended recipient
Shared
The originator and the intended recipient may be the same person. The intended recipient must be the originator, a U.S. person in the United States, or a person otherwise authorized to receive the technical data, such as by a license or other approval pursuant to this subchapter.
AC.L2-3.1.1Every user authenticates with a unique RSA-2048 key pair plus password (signed challenge-response); there is no backdoor or shared access path. A user can open a resource only if its AES key has been re-encrypted to that user's public key.
AC.L2-3.1.1Run the account lifecycle: approve new accounts, assign teams and permission profiles, and remove users who no longer need access.
Definition
Access to encrypted technical data
Shared
The ability to access technical data in encrypted form that satisfies the criteria set forth in paragraph (a)(5) of this section does not constitute the release or export of such technical data.
AC.L2-3.1.4Tiered administrative roles (sub-admin, admin, super admin, infrastructure root) separate duties, and every admin tier is cryptographically excluded from reading user data.SC.L2-3.13.3User work runs in Secure VMs, separate from the security layer and management services; administrators never see plaintext user data.MP.L2-3.8.2Reading CUI requires tiCrypt authentication and the owner's key, regardless of who can touch the media.
AC.L2-3.1.4Decide which staff hold each admin tier and document the profile assignments.MP.L2-3.8.2Control physical access to the media.
Encryption provision
Access information
Shared
Access information is information that allows access to encrypted technical data subject to this subchapter in an unencrypted form. Examples include decryption keys, network access codes, and passwords.
SC.L2-3.13.10Keys are generated client-side: a random 256-bit key per file and drive, wrapped with the user's RSA-2048 public key, and an RSA-2048 key pair per user. No key is stored unwrapped on the server. Key recovery uses escrow split across independent escrow groups, three by default.IA.L2-3.5.10Passwords are never sent to or stored on the server. The private key is AES-256 encrypted client-side. Tera Insights requires MFA and split credentials for every production deployment. With them enabled, the server holds the key's salt and IV and returns them only after MFA succeeds, so neither side can recover the key alone.
SC.L2-3.13.10Define escrow groups (three by default) and their membership.IA.L2-3.5.10Keep MFA and split credentials enabled, and choose the MFA provider.Treat key files, passwords and escrow keys as access information: do not let them reach a foreign person without authorization.
Definition
Release through access information
Shared
The use of access information to cause or enable a foreign person, including yourself, to access, view, or possess unencrypted technical data; or
AC.L2-3.1.1Every user authenticates with a unique RSA-2048 key pair plus password (signed challenge-response); there is no backdoor or shared access path. A user can open a resource only if its AES key has been re-encrypted to that user's public key.
AC.L2-3.1.1Run the account lifecycle: approve new accounts, assign teams and permission profiles, and remove users who no longer need access.
Release and access information
Decryption outside the United States
Shared
The use of access information to cause technical data outside of the United States to be in unencrypted form.
SC.L2-3.13.2Zero-knowledge design: client-side encryption, user-held keys, microservice isolation, and least privilege mean the server operates on data it cannot read.AU.L2-3.3.2Every action is tied to an authenticated user, session, and source IP, with millisecond UTC timestamps and a hash-chain position.
Set and enforce the rule on project members using tiCrypt outside the United States. Decryption happens on the member's own device.
Release and access information
Provision of access information
Shared
Authorization for a release of technical data to a foreign person is required to provide access information to that foreign person, if that access information can cause or enable access, viewing, or possession of the unencrypted technical data.
AC.L2-3.1.1Every user authenticates with a unique RSA-2048 key pair plus password (signed challenge-response); there is no backdoor or shared access path. A user can open a resource only if its AES key has been re-encrypted to that user's public key.
AC.L2-3.1.1Run the account lifecycle: approve new accounts, assign teams and permission profiles, and remove users who no longer need access.
Release and access information
U.S. person
University
U.S. person means a person who is a lawful permanent resident as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20) or who is a protected individual as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(3). It also means any corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other entity, organization, or group that is incorporated to do business in the United States. It also includes any governmental (Federal, state, or local) entity. It does not include any foreign person as defined in § 120.63.
University control, not addressed by tiCrypt
Definition
Foreign person
University
Foreign person means any natural person who is not a lawful permanent resident as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20) or who is not a protected individual as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(3). It also means any foreign corporation, business association, partnership, trust, society, or any other entity or group that is not incorporated or organized to do business in the United States, as well as international organizations, foreign governments, and any agency or subdivision of foreign governments (e.g., diplomatic missions).
University control, not addressed by tiCrypt
Definition
Deemed export
Shared
Releasing or otherwise transferring “technology” or source code (but not object code) to a foreign person in the United States (a “deemed export”);
A user has a decryption path to a project's data only if a resource's key has been re-encrypted to that user's public key. tiCrypt administrators, superadmins and operating-system root are cryptographically excluded from project data, and a running Secure VM has no interactive login path outside that access. Admitting only authorized U.S. persons to a project therefore leaves no non-U.S. person with a decryption path through normal use, VM access or administrative privilege.
Make the export-control determination and decide who may join the project. Key escrow is the one path that can exist outside project membership: see the row on the means of decryption.
Release and access information
Release through access information
Shared
Any act causing the “release” of “technology” or “software,” through use of “access information” or otherwise, to yourself or another person requires an authorization to the same extent an authorization would be required to export or reexport such “technology” or “software” to that person.
AC.L2-3.1.1Every user authenticates with a unique RSA-2048 key pair plus password (signed challenge-response); there is no backdoor or shared access path. A user can open a resource only if its AES key has been re-encrypted to that user's public key.
AC.L2-3.1.1Run the account lifecycle: approve new accounts, assign teams and permission profiles, and remove users who no longer need access.
Release and access information
Transfer between persons in the United States who are not foreign persons
Shared
Transmitting or otherwise transferring “technology” or “software” to a person in the United States who is not a foreign person from another person in the United States.
AC.L2-3.1.1Every user authenticates with a unique RSA-2048 key pair plus password (signed challenge-response); there is no backdoor or shared access path. A user can open a resource only if its AES key has been re-encrypted to that user's public key.
AC.L2-3.1.1Run the account lifecycle: approve new accounts, assign teams and permission profiles, and remove users who no longer need access.
Not an export
Unclassified
University
Unclassified;
University control, not addressed by tiCrypt
Confirm that the data is unclassified. The export-control determination is the organization's.
Encryption provision
No CMMC Level 2 counterpart
Secured using end-to-end encryption
tiCrypt
Secured using 'end-to-end encryption;'
SC.L2-3.13.8Data in transit is double-encrypted (TLS 1.2+ plus Diffie-Hellman session keys) with FIPS-validated algorithms, and SHA-256 verifies integrity.SC.L2-3.13.16CUI is AES-256 encrypted at rest: Vault files in 8 MB chunks with per-file keys, and VM drives with LUKS or BitLocker. Metadata such as file names is not encrypted at rest.AC.L2-3.1.13Remote sessions are double-encrypted: TLS plus a per-session Diffie-Hellman layer between client and VM, using FIPS-validated AES-256, RSA-2048, and SHA-256.
SC.L2-3.13.16Keep the storage that holds the ciphertext, and the unencrypted metadata database, inside your assessment scope: encrypted CUI is still CUI (CMMC FAQ, July 2026, question B-Q8). Do not put CUI in file or directory names.
Encryption provision
FIPS 140 cryptographic modules
tiCrypt
Secured using cryptographic modules (hardware or “software”) compliant with Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 (FIPS 140-2) or its successors, supplemented by “software” implementation, cryptographic key management and other procedures and controls that are in accordance with guidance provided in current U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology publications, or other equally or more effective cryptographic means; and
SC.L2-3.13.11Every cryptographic operation that protects CUI runs through the OpenSSL 3.1.2 FIPS provider (CMVP #4985, FIPS 140-3) in approved mode: the key operations on the user's client and everything the VM controller does. tiCrypt implements no cryptography of its own. The backend encrypts no CUI; it verifies signatures and computes hashes with the Java runtime's libraries. Drive encryption inside VMs is performed by LUKS or BitLocker on the operating system's own validated modules, with the operating system's FIPS mode enabled.SC.L2-3.13.10Keys are generated client-side: a random 256-bit key per file and drive, wrapped with the user's RSA-2048 public key, and an RSA-2048 key pair per user. No key is stored unwrapped on the server. Key recovery uses escrow split across independent escrow groups, three by default.
SC.L2-3.13.10Define escrow groups (three by default) and their membership.
Encryption provision
Not stored in a Country Group D:5 country
Shared
Not intentionally stored in a country listed in Country Group D:5 (see supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR). Note 1 to paragraph (a)(5)(iv): Data in-transit via the internet is not deemed to be stored.
AC.L2-3.1.3Within tiCrypt, CUI moves only through encrypted, audited channels (Vault transfers in encrypted chunks, managed tunnels). SFTP into the enclave is upload-only, and exports out of a project require explicit, logged authorization.
AC.L2-3.1.3Designate who may approve exports out of a project. Authorize where storage replication and backup jobs may copy tiCrypt's ciphertext, which is still CUI (CMMC FAQ, July 2026, question B-Q8).Choose where the hosts, storage, replicas and backups are located, and keep them out of the countries in Country Group D:5.
Encryption provision
End-to-end encryption: no unencrypted form in between
Shared
the provision of cryptographic protection of data such that the data is not in unencrypted form between an originator (or the originator's in-country security boundary) and an intended recipient (or the recipient's in-country security boundary)
SC.L2-3.13.8Data in transit is double-encrypted (TLS 1.2+ plus Diffie-Hellman session keys) with FIPS-validated algorithms, and SHA-256 verifies integrity.SC.L2-3.13.16CUI is AES-256 encrypted at rest: Vault files in 8 MB chunks with per-file keys, and VM drives with LUKS or BitLocker. Metadata such as file names is not encrypted at rest.MP.L2-3.8.6Data is ciphertext from the moment it is created (AES-256), so media, replicas, and backups are protected in transport without the owner's key; network transport adds TLS plus Diffie-Hellman.
SC.L2-3.13.16Keep the storage that holds the ciphertext, and the unencrypted metadata database, inside your assessment scope: encrypted CUI is still CUI (CMMC FAQ, July 2026, question B-Q8). Do not put CUI in file or directory names.MP.L2-3.8.6Keep encrypted media, replicas, and backups under your media-handling procedures in transport, and send them only to systems inside your assessment scope. Encrypted CUI is still CUI (CMMC FAQ, July 2026, question B-Q8).Keep controlled data out of file and directory names, which the platform database holds unencrypted. Files sent to an SFTP inbox are encrypted on arrival, so keep the SFTP host inside your in-country security boundary.
Definition
End-to-end encryption: means of decryption
Shared
the means of decryption are not provided to any third party. The originator and the recipient may be the same person.
Keys are generated on the user's client and none is stored unwrapped on the server, so the infrastructure and its administrators hold no means of decryption. Tera Insights supplies tiCrypt as software and has no access to a deployment. Key escrow is the one path that can exist outside project membership: when it is enabled, a user's private key can be reconstructed only by one member of every escrow group acting together, three groups by default, and system administrators cannot serve on the escrow team.
Choose whether the project's accounts are escrowed. If they are, make sure every escrow member who could recover a key used on the project is authorized to receive the data, and govern and log key recovery as a controlled action. With escrow off there is no recovery path, and a lost key or forgotten password leaves the data unrecoverable.
Definition
Access to encrypted technology or software
Shared
The ability to access “technology” or “software” in encrypted form that satisfies the criteria set forth in paragraph (a)(5) of this section does not constitute the release or export of such “technology” or “software.”
AC.L2-3.1.4Tiered administrative roles (sub-admin, admin, super admin, infrastructure root) separate duties, and every admin tier is cryptographically excluded from reading user data.SC.L2-3.13.3User work runs in Secure VMs, separate from the security layer and management services; administrators never see plaintext user data.MP.L2-3.8.2Reading CUI requires tiCrypt authentication and the owner's key, regardless of who can touch the media.
AC.L2-3.1.4Decide which staff hold each admin tier and document the profile assignments.MP.L2-3.8.2Control physical access to the media.
Encryption provision
Transfer of access information
Shared
To the extent an authorization would be required to transfer “technology” or “software,” a comparable authorization is required to transfer “access information” if done with “knowledge” that such transfer would result in the release of such “technology” or “software” without a required authorization.
SC.L2-3.13.10Keys are generated client-side: a random 256-bit key per file and drive, wrapped with the user's RSA-2048 public key, and an RSA-2048 key pair per user. No key is stored unwrapped on the server. Key recovery uses escrow split across independent escrow groups, three by default.IA.L2-3.5.10Passwords are never sent to or stored on the server. The private key is AES-256 encrypted client-side. Tera Insights requires MFA and split credentials for every production deployment. With them enabled, the server holds the key's salt and IV and returns them only after MFA succeeds, so neither side can recover the key alone.
SC.L2-3.13.10Define escrow groups (three by default) and their membership.IA.L2-3.5.10Keep MFA and split credentials enabled, and choose the MFA provider.Treat key files, passwords and escrow keys as access information: do not let them reach a foreign person without authorization.
Release and access information
Access information
Shared
For purposes of § 734.19(a), information that allows access to encrypted technology or encrypted software in an unencrypted form. Examples include decryption keys, network access codes, and passwords.
SC.L2-3.13.10Keys are generated client-side: a random 256-bit key per file and drive, wrapped with the user's RSA-2048 public key, and an RSA-2048 key pair per user. No key is stored unwrapped on the server. Key recovery uses escrow split across independent escrow groups, three by default.IA.L2-3.5.10Passwords are never sent to or stored on the server. The private key is AES-256 encrypted client-side. Tera Insights requires MFA and split credentials for every production deployment. With them enabled, the server holds the key's salt and IV and returns them only after MFA succeeds, so neither side can recover the key alone.
SC.L2-3.13.10Define escrow groups (three by default) and their membership.IA.L2-3.5.10Keep MFA and split credentials enabled, and choose the MFA provider.Treat key files, passwords and escrow keys as access information: do not let them reach a foreign person without authorization.
Definition
Foreign person
University
Any natural person who is not a lawful permanent resident of the United States, citizen of the United States, or any other protected individual as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(3). It also means any corporation, business association, partnership, trust, society or any other entity or group that is not incorporated in the United States or organized to do business in the United States, as well as international organizations, foreign governments and any agency or subdivision of a foreign government (e.g., diplomatic mission). “Foreign person” is synonymous with “foreign national,” as used in the EAR, and “foreign person” as used in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 CFR 120.16). This definition does not apply to part 760 of the EAR (Restrictive Trade Practices or Boycotts).
University control, not addressed by tiCrypt
Definition

This guide maps Tera Insights' published shared-responsibility model for tiCrypt to the cited sections of the ITAR and the EAR. It is not legal advice. The export-control determination, and whether an activity needs a license, rest with the organization and its empowered official. Release baseline (ticrypt.com/releases, November 12, 2026): Frontend 2.19.0 · Backend 3.16.3 · Host Controller 1.3.2 · Audit 1.10.1 · SFTP 1.5.1